公司简易并购程序中的公允价值：简析《开曼群岛公司法》第238条 ｜ 跨境顾释

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近年来，当发生涉及开曼群岛注册公司的公司并购时，公司股东越来越倾向于向开曼群岛大法院（下称“法院”）提出申请，要求法院以司法判决的形式赋予其股份“公允价值”，而不是直接接受公司所提议的并购对价。

根据《开曼群岛公司法》（“公司法”）第238条，当有股东不同意开曼群岛注册公司提出的并购时，他们有权向法院申请确认其所持有的股份的价值，而不是接受公司提出的并购计划中的股份价格。

Changyou.com 有限公司案（案件编号：FSD 120 of 2020）

在最近Changyou.com 有限公司案（案件编号：FSD 120 of 2020）的判决中，法院考虑了《公司法》第233(7)及238条的规定，确认了一个非常具体但依然重要的问题，即在简易并购的情况下，股东也有权对简易并购提出异议，并就其股份获得一个“公允价值”。

简易并购是指当一间母公司持有子公司不少于90%的表决权时与其子公司进行的并购（《公司法》第233(7)条）。之所以称之为简易并购，是因为在这种情况下不用像《公司法》第233(6)条所规定的正常程序那样，需要股东投票通过特别决议。

此案涉及在开曼群岛注册的中国科技行业公司Changyou.com Limited（“Changyou”），是一家由Sohu.com Limited（“Sohu”）间接持有的全资子公司。Sohu.com (Game) Limited （“Sohu Game”是一间Sohu间接全资拥有的子公司）与Changyou Merger Co. Limited（“Changyou Merger Co.”，是Sohu Game与Changyou直接持有的全资子公司）公布了并购计划并达成了并购协议。根据该并购协议，Changyou Merger Co.自2020年4月17日起并入Changyou，而Changyou（下称“该公司”）则成为存续公司。根据上述的公司股权结构，Changyou Merger Co.已持有该公司所有已发行及现行股份的95.2%表决权。这意味着此次并购无需经过该公司股东的表决，只需根据《公司法》第233(7)条进行简易并购。

该公司反对小股东根据《公司法》第238条向法院提出的异议与确认股份公允价值的请求，其理由是，鉴于该公司采取了简易并购程序，股东没有投票，因此小股东无权提出异议。由于按照第238条的规定，请求确认股份公允价值的前提是股东必须对并购提出异议，因此小股东不能向法院申请确认其股份价值。持有该公司余下4.8%表决权的小股东们并不同意这一观点。他们根据《公司法》第238条向法院提交申请，要求确认其股份的公允价值，因此随之而来的“小股东在简易并购中是否有权向法院申请确认其股票公允价值”的问题也被提上法院。

法院认为，《公司法》第238条赋予了任何反对并购的股东获得其股份的公允价值的权利。法院也提到了股东在简易并购程序下向法院申请评估股份公允价值时应遵循的程序。法院的理由在于，如果股东仅仅因为在程序中不能投票而被剥夺提出异议的权利，将会是一个荒谬的结论。

法院认为，《公司法》第233(6)条下关于授权并购计划的规定，在简易并购的程序中仍然可以实施，即使简易程序中没有投票表决的环节，但依然存在各种方法可以将其实现——例如，虽然不需要投票，但可以允许小股东发出异议通知。在这种情况下，异议应不会针对并购本身，而是针对以并购计划中的价格收购小股东股份。异议通知可在小股东收到合并计划后20天内发出。

法院指出，如果接受了公司方的观点，开曼的法规制度会成为国际习惯的例外。例如，根据英国法，虽然其法律体系中没有直接等同于简易并购的规定，但英国法下存在对强制挤出条款的限制，禁止持有公司90%以上表决权的股东仅从自身意志出发，以他们认为合适的条款剥夺小股东的股份。同样，百慕大、英属维京群岛和美国特拉华州都有类似的合并制度，但没有一个地方的法律会允许持异议的小股东被剥夺就其股份获得公允价值的权利。因此，法院认为，若立法者没有明确表示让开曼群岛成为国际上的例外，即持有公司90%以上多数股份的股东有权，而小股东却无权要求评估其股份的公允价值，那这种理解是非常出人意料的。

法院进一步解释，虽然允许在简易并购中强制收购小股东的股份有其经济上的裨益，但这只有在满足法律规定的特定条件的情况下才有可能做到——例如法律规定要及时支付足够的赔偿，并确保小股东有权向法院申诉，以确认其股份的赔偿金额。

最后，法院认为，《公司法》及其设立简易并购机制的目的是赋予所有有异议的股东获得公允价值的权利，这一点是非常清晰的。如果法律的起草者或立法者在制定这一程序或机制的过程中有所疏漏，忽视了这一类反对者（即简易并购程序中的异议股东)，那么可以且应当使用适当的语言来解释这些条款，以实现《公司法》中相关条款的最终目的。

关键要点

此案的判决清晰地体现了开曼法院重视实务与商业考量的倾向。特别是在最近开曼群岛经常审理有关《公司法》第238条案件的背景下，法院对简易并购的规范进一步澄清是非常有益的。

法院的判决赋予了小股东得到公平对待的权利，也确保了简易并购机制和其他公司合并中的常用机制（如强制挤出）之间的一致性，以及与英国、英属维京群岛和百慕大等其他司法管辖区的法律一致性。

有鉴于此，这一判决对于那些希望明确自身可行使的权利边界的股东而言应当是一个受到欢迎的决定，也有利于法院继续保持其所希望采取的务实合理的断案方式。

本文的英文原稿，请参见下文。

Fair value in short-form mergers: a pearl of clarification in the Cayman Islands s.238 saga

In recent years, where there has been a merger involving a Cayman Islands incorporated company, it has been a popular trend for shareholders of those companies to apply to the Cayman Islands Grand Court (the "Court") to award them a judicially fair value for their shares instead of accepting the merger consideration which is being offered by the merging company.

Under section 238 of the Cayman Islands Companies Act (the "Act"), shareholders have the statutory right to dissent from the merger of a Cayman Islands incorporated company and to ask the Court to determine the value of the shares rather than accept the value of the shares being offered as part of the merger.

Changyou.com Limited FSD 120 of 2020

In the recent decision of Changyou.com Limited FSD 120 of 2020, the Court considered the provisions of ss. 233(7) and 238 of the Act and confirmed a specific but significant point, which is that shareholders are entitled to dissent from and be paid fair value for their shares in relation to a "short-form" merger.

A "short-form" merger is where a parent company holding at least 90% of the voting rights of its subsidiary merges with the subsidiary (s.233(7) of the Act). It is called a "short-form" merger because no vote of members by special resolution is required, as is the usual process under s.233(6) of the Act.

In this case, Changyou.com Limited ("Changyou") was a Cayman Islands incorporated company operating in the People's Republic of China in the technology sector, and was an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Sohu.com Limited ("Sohu"). A merger plan was announced and implemented by an agreement between Sohu.com (Game) Limited ("Sohu Game"), an indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary of Sohu; and Changyou Merger Co. Limited ("Changyou Merger Co."), a directly wholly-owned subsidiary of Sohu Game, and Changyou. Pursuant to the merger agreement, Changyou Merger Co. merged with and into Changyou with effect from 17 April 2020, with Changyou (hereinafter, the "Company") becoming the surviving company. As a result of the corporate shareholdings described above, Changyou Merger Co., already owned 95.2% of the voting power represented by all issued and outstanding shares of the Company. This meant that the merger was not subject to a vote of shareholders of the Company, but proceeded with a "short-form" merger under s.233(7) of the Act.

The Company's argument for opposing the minority shareholder's petition to the Court for a determination of fair value under s.238 of the Act was that given that it was undertaking a short-form merger, the shareholders did not vote, and therefore had no right to dissent. Since s.238 requires the shareholder to dissent to the merger, the minority shareholders could not ask the Court for a fair value determination of the value of the shares. The petitioners, who were the minority shareholders holding the remaining 4.8% of the voting shares of the Company, disagreed. They filed a petition for a determination of the fair value of their shares in accordance with s.238 of the Act, and the question of whether the minority shareholders in a short-form merger are entitled to have the Court determine the fair value of their shares was put to the Court.

The Court held that s.238 of the Act did confer the right to be paid fair value on any shareholder dissenting from a merger. It also indicated the procedure by which a member may apply to the Court for the appraisal of fair value when dealing with short-form mergers. The reason for the Court's decision was because the Court considered it to be an absurd conclusion if a shareholder was denied its dissenting rights simply because it was not allowed to vote as part of the procedural process.

The Court was of the opinion that the appraisal process in a short-form merger can operate without a vote under s.233(6) authorising a plan of merger. There are various ways of doing this – for example, allowing a notice of dissent to be given although there is no need for a vote. In that event, the dissent would not be from the merger itself but only insofar as it would result in the acquisition of the shares of the minority for the stipulated merger price. The notice of dissent could be given within 20 days of receiving the copy of the merger plan by the shareholders.

The Court noted that if the Company's argument were accepted, that would make the Cayman statutory regime an outlier. For example, under English law, although there is no direct equivalent of a short-form merger, English law would not allow squeeze-out provisions to be used to enable a 90% majority to deprive a minority of their shares at will and on whatever terms they see fit. Similarly, in each of Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and Delaware, there are comparable merger regimes and in none of them is a dissenting minority able to be deprived of the right to be paid fair value for their shares. As such, the Court held that it would be very surprising if the legislators had intended, without expressly saying so, that the Cayman Islands be an international outlier in which a shareholder which obtains a 90% majority of shares in another company could do so without the minority having the right of appraisal of the fair value of its shares.

The Court further explained that whilst the compulsory acquisition of a minority's shares under a short-form merger is allowed because it is expedient for promoting the economic well-being of the community, this is only possible if certain conditions are met – such as provision in the law for the prompt payment of adequate compensation and ensuring that the minority shareholder has the right to access the Court to determine the amount of compensation for its shares.

Ultimately, the Court held that it was quite clear that the intended purpose of Act and the short-form merger provision in question was to confer the right to be paid fair value on all dissenting shareholders. To the extent that by inadvertence the draftsman or legislature produced a procedure or mechanism which overlooked one class of dissenters (namely those dissenting from a short-form merger), appropriate language to give effect to that intention may and should be read into those provisions to carry that purpose into effect.

Key takeaway points

The decision in this case provides a clear example of the Court's pragmatic and commercial approach. Particularly against the backdrop of the recent popularity of s.238 cases being heard and decided in the Cayman Islands, having this pearl of clarity with respect to short-form mergers is beneficial.

The Court's decision allows for fairness to minority shareholders, and also ensures consistency of approach between the short-form merger mechanism and other commonly used tools, such as a squeeze-out, as well as consistency with other jurisdictions such as England, the BVI and Bermuda.

In light of this, this decision is a welcome one for shareholders seeking clarity on what rights they can exercise, and for maintaining the practical and reasonable approach that the Court has sought to adopt.

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